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DIVERGENCES AND CONVERGENCES OF
COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS ON
ASSET PARTITIONING: A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
Giacomo Rojas Elgueta*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to bring insight from the civil law
tradition to the corporate debate on asset partitioning, which has developed
over the last decade in the common law literature. Exposing common law
scholars to legal solutions that are rooted in civil law systems will
potentially transform the traditional approach taken by comparative civil
law scholars in this field. In fact, civil law scholars have produced an
extensive body of literature on the feasibility of transplanting one of the
most successful products of equity—trust law—to the civil law tradition.1
In comparative law studies, scholars have overlooked the possibility that
the common law legal system could benefit from solutions developed under
the civil law tradition with respect to the partitioning of assets.
Therefore, this Article intends to create a two-way dialogue between
the common law and civil law traditions regarding this particular area of
law, and to reveal efficient solutions developed in continental Europe.
Asset partitioning can be defined either as the segregation of an
owner’s assets from a firm’s creditors, or the segregation of an
organization’s assets from its owners’ personal creditors. Henry Hansmann
and Reinier Kraakman have emphasized the latter aspect, in particular,
suggesting that an organization is truly characterized by such a protection
of its assets.2 These authors have noticed that the legal effect of this
* S.J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Assistant Professor of
Private Law, University of Roma Tre. I am grateful to Anita Anand, Henry Hansmann,
Edward B. Rock and David A. Skeel for their invaluable comments. I am also grateful to
those who gave me comments at the 2008 Italian Society of Law and Economics Annual
Conference, at the 2009 Roma, Siena Tel Aviv, Toronto Law & Economics International
Workshop, and at the 2009 Canadian Law and Economics Association Conference.
1. See, e.g., MAURIZIO LUPOI, TRUSTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 268 (2000) (discussing
the development of the transition of trust law into the civil law framework in Europe).
2. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law,
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characterization of asset partitioning cannot be effectively achieved by
contract alone. A special rule of law is necessary in order to exclude
claims by owners’ personal creditors on a firm’s assets without those
creditors’ consent.3
This Article will identify, from a functional perspective, the costs and
benefits of different legal methods used to partition assets. The
comparative analysis of these various partitioning devices will help us
understand the economics of achieving affirmative asset partitioning
through the creation of a new legal entity, as opposed to doing so through a
property law which grants “asset independence” within the boundaries of
the same entity.
While American legal scholars conceive asset partitioning exclusively
through the formation of a new legal entity, the civil law tradition allows
this legal effect to be achieved within the boundaries of the same legal
subject. This tradition avoids the creation of multiple legal entities.
In the common law system, there is a sharp trade-off between the costs
avoided due to asset partitioning (e.g., lower monitoring costs for
specialized creditors), and the benefits lost by not having legal integration
take place within a single entity (e.g., information economies of scale). In
contrast, by allowing a legal subject to partition these assets not only
outside but also within the boundaries of the same legal subject, the “asset
independence” doctrine of the civil law tradition successfully overcomes
this trade-off.
The analysis is organized as follows: Part II provides a description of
the current debate on asset partitioning in the U.S., i.e., the corporate theory
debate. Part III describes the doctrine of “asset independence” rooted in
the civil law tradition. Part IV discusses the historical evolution of asset
partitioning in civil and common law traditions. Part V examines the costs
and benefits of civil and common law regulations on asset partitioning,
with regard to different business transactions (including asset securitization
and the organization of a mutual fund). Finally, Part VI offers concluding
remarks describing how financial transactions are the driving power behind
the current convergence between civil and common law traditions on asset
partitioning.
II.

THE CORPORATE THEORY DEBATE ON ASSET PARTITIONING IN THE
U.S.

In 2000, Hansmann and Kraakman published an essay entitled The
Essential Role of Organizational Law in the Yale Law Journal.4 Since
110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000).
3. Id. at 394.
4. Id. at 387.
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then, a lively doctrinal debate has developed over the notion of asset
partitioning and its attributes.5
The fundamental question posed by these two authors is: what
essential role did organizational law play in modern society?
Hansmann and Kraakman offer an answer that diverges from the
traditional position, which singled out limited liability as the defining
characteristic of several business organizations.6 Instead, according to
Hansmann and Kraakman, what truly characterizes an organization is
precisely the reverse of limited liability: assigning to the organization’s
creditors a pool of assets that is shielded from the claims of the creditors of
that entity’s owners and managers.7
More specifically, asset partitioning is characterized by two
symmetrical sides. The first side, which these authors label as “defensive
asset partitioning” or “owner shielding,” is the most traditional and wellexplored.8 By these terms, they mean the protection of the personal assets
of a firm’s owners from the firm’s creditors: what traditionally is called
limited liability.9 The second side, “affirmative asset partitioning” or
“entity shielding,” represents the reverse of defensive asset partitioning,
where the terms refer to the protection of a firm’s assets from the claims of
personal creditors of its owners and managers.10
The law governing business corporations is one of the clearest
examples of affirmative asset partitioning. Through incorporation, an
individual is able to commit a pool of assets to a specific business and
specified group of creditors. The assets, in coming under the ownership of

5. John Armour & Michael J. Whincop, The Proprietary Foundations of Corporate
Law, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 429 (2007); Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What
Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L.
REV. 387 (2003); Edward M. Iacobucci & George G. Triantis, Economic and Legal
Boundaries of Firms, 93 VA. L. REV. 515 (2007); Paul G. Mahoney, Contract or
Concession? An Essay on the History of Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 873 (2000); Lynn
A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, U. ILL. L. REV. 253 (2005).
6. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporations, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 97 (1985) (finding that “limited liability facilitates
optimal investment decisions. . . . The increased availability of funds for projects with
positive net values is the real benefit of limited liability”); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 41 (1991) (“The
instances of ‘unlimited’ liability are few . . . . Limitations on liability turn out to be
pervasive.”).
7. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 394.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 393-94, 423; Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law
and Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1339 (2006) (relabeling as “owner
shielding,” the phenomenon that, in their previous work, was labeled “defensive asset
partitioning”).
10. Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 9, at 1359 (discussing “entity shielding
in Roman peculium businesses”).
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the corporation, achieve the desired goal of partitioning them from the
personal creditors of the corporation’s shareholders. The same mechanism
could be chosen by a company that wishes to separate the creditors along
two distinct lines of business. Creating two distinct subsidiary corporations
allows a single parent company to partition the assets in separate pools,
each one committed to a specified group of creditors.
Until Hansmann and Kraakman’s article, corporate literature had
traditionally overlooked the affirmative side of asset partitioning.
Subsequently, several corporate studies have focused more on this
characteristic, pointing to it as the key peculiarity of legal personality.
Using various terminologies (e.g., “forward partitioning,”11 “capital lockin,”12 “asset separation from shareholders,”13 “resource commitment”14),
corporate scholars have agreed with Hansmann and Kraakman that the
essential—if traditionally overlooked—contribution of business
organization law is to permanently commit owners’ contributions to a firm
so that those assets cannot be suddenly withdrawn from the firm by either
the owners’ creditors or the owners themselves.
One of the merits of Hansmann and Kraakman’s article is not simply
to have shifted the attention of corporate scholars to this less-explored,
affirmative side of asset partitioning, but to have prompted a
reconsideration of the common notion of a firm as a mere “nexus of
contracts,” and of corporate law, however specialized, as a mere branch of
contract law.15
In the seventies, the economic model which recognized a firm as
nothing more than a complex set of contracts became the dominant
approach, thanks to the contributions of Alchian and Demsetz16 and, a few

11. Mahoney, supra note 5, at 876-77 (using “forward partitioning” to designate the
reverse of limited liability, which is, in turn, referred to as “reverse partitioning”).
12. Blair, supra note 5, at 387 (referring to the ability to commit capital to a specific
investment, with no possibility for shareholders and their creditors to extract assets from the
firm as “capital lock-in.” The same terminology has been used by Stout, supra note 5, at
254.
13. WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE:
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 108 (9th ed. 2004).
14. Blair, supra note 5, at 392 (explaining her terminology by noting that “perhaps as
important as protecting the assets of the enterprise from participants’ creditors . . . was the
role played in establishing a pool of assets that was not subject to being liquidated or
dissolved by any of the individual participants who might want to recover their
investment.”).
15. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis, 84
NW. U. L. REV. 542, 549 (1990) (discussing Ralph Winter, Henry Butler, Frank Easterbrook
and Dan Fischel's view of the "corporate charter as a freely chosen contract between
shareholders and managers").
16. Armen A. Alchian & Harlod Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
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years later, Jensen and Meckling.17 If a firm is nothing more than the sum
of contracts binding different stakeholders (e.g., shareholders, officers,
directors, debtholders, employees and suppliers), corporate law risks
becoming trivialized, since it would only serve to introduce a set of default
standards for business organizations that could also be introduced, at a
higher cost, by commercial actors.18
Hansmann and Kraakman show in their essay that the contractarian
theory of corporate law is not in itself sufficient to explain the role played
by organizational law. They observe that, in the universe of business
organizations, there are outcomes which cannot be practicably established
by contract alone, one of which being “affirmative asset partitioning.”19
Without a special rule of law to limit the rights of owners’ personal
creditors over firms’ assets, it would be necessary for each owner of a firm
to negotiate a waiver with these creditors regarding the seizing of the firm’s
assets, or an agreement subordinating their claim to those of the firm’s
creditors. Such affirmative asset partitioning through the use of contracts
would not only impose prohibitively high transaction costs (since each
owner would have to convince all of his individual creditors to accept this
waiver), but also create obvious moral hazards and, consequently,
excessive monitoring costs. Each waiver, in fact, by improving the
position of a firm’s creditors, creates a collective benefit for all of its
owners by reducing the cost of credit. But, at the same time, such a waiver
increases the personal cost of credit to individual owners. As a
consequence, each owner has a clear incentive to act as a free rider, and
omit the waiver from his personal contracts. This opportunistic behavior,
which improves the position of the free rider’s personal creditors to the
detriment of the firm’s creditors, effectively reduces the free rider’s
personal borrowing costs while imposing an increase in the firm’s
borrowing costs to the rest of the owners. The possibility for this type of
opportunistic activity, which would increase with the number of owners,
leads to excessive monitoring costs that render a successful partitioning

17. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
18. The classic approach of Alchian and Demsetz, and Jensen and Meckling, has been
further developed. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, passim. The Law & Economics
approach views corporate law as a tool for “filling gaps” by introducing the default rules
that would be desired by the parties had they been able to contract without transaction costs.
See Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in
Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977) (commenting on the
doctrines of impossibility, impracticability and frustration in contract law). On the
significance of corporate law in the light of the “nexus of contracts” theory, see Bernard S.
Black, supra note 15, at 549.
19. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 406; Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire,
supra note 9, at 1340-41.
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practically impossible without a special rule of law.20
Under corporate law—or more generally, organizational law—
excluding claims of personal creditors over a firm’s assets without their
consent allows owners to create an affirmative asset partitioning, without
incurring the transaction and monitoring costs highlighted above, simply by
using a property law—a rule that is “good against the world”.21 This rule
of law, which according to Hansmann and Kraakman is the essential
contribution of organizational law, challenges the perspective that views
corporate law as a mere branch of contract law, recovering a proprietary
foundation for it.22
Hansmann and Kraakman’s analysis has two essential merits to be
stressed: first, it recognizes the affirmative side of asset partitioning as the
core defining characteristic of an organization and second, it labels this
attribute as one of property, made possible only by a special rule of law.
From these two main ideas, a functional analysis of the benefits and costs
of asset partitioning has followed in the corporate theory literature.23
20. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 406-11; Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire,
supra note 9, at 1340-41.
21. See Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, Trust Law in the United States: A Basic Study
of Its Special Contribution, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 133, 134 (1998) (reaching the conclusion that
the contribution offered by the law of trusts is “that it facilitates the partitioning of assets
into bundles that can conveniently be pledged separately to different classes of creditors”).
These authors believe that the classic literature focusing on fiduciary duties as the main
characteristic of trust law overlooks the point that these aspects could be achieved even
without a special property rule by simply using the basic tools of contract and agency law.
Id. at 136. But cf. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105
YALE L.J. 625 (1995) (discussing the contractarian underpinning to trust law). See also
Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 627
(2004) (advancing the claim that trust law blends features that are familiar from both
property and contract law).
22. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 422 (“[B]oth organizational law and
the law of security interests are at bottom, in important part, forms of property law: They
define the types of property interests that can be created and made binding against third
parties.”); see also Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, at 569 (emphasizing the concept that
legal partitioning can be realized only by way of a property law and that, consequently, a
corporation is more than a nexus of contracts); Blair, supra note 5, at 407 (noting that an
understanding of separate entity status under the law is key to understanding how
incorporation changes the relationship between stakeholders into something different from a
simple agency relationship); Armour & Whincop, supra note 5, at 431 (stating that the
allocation of property rights to firm assets is significant for governance of the enterprise).
This position, while recognizing the role of corporate law as a tool to provide a set of
standard organizational forms (contractarian perspective), stresses a “Coasean” idea of the
firm as an instrument to eliminate market transactions. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
OF CAPITALISM (1985); OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
(1995).
23. The benefits of affirmative asset partitioning include the reduction of monitoring
costs and preservation of beneficiaries’ assets. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at
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This Article aims to bring a comparative perspective to the analysis
developed up to this point in the U.S. legal literature and, in particular, the
European civil law tradition, with respect to asset partitioning. Bringing
the latter into the current debate not only serves to broaden the more
limited American version of the doctrine but, on a more pragmatic level,
points to the revision of conclusions reached by American scholars in their
functional analysis of this legal phenomenon.
III. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES DEBATE ON ASSET PARTITIONING
IN LIGHT OF THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION
In the civil law tradition, affirmative asset partitioning captured the
attention of legal scholars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
when the notion of juridical person was fully distinguished from that of
“asset independence” (also termed asset autonomy). At this stage in the
civil law system, it became clear that in order to create an affirmative asset
partitioning it would not be necessary to form a new legal entity or juridical
person. Legal scholars began to acknowledge the possibility that a fixed
number of property laws (known in the civil law tradition as numerus
clausus) could enable a legal subject (either a natural person or a legal
entity) to be the owner of multiple, separate pools of assets, each
committed to a different purpose and pledged to a specified group of
creditors (“asset independence” doctrine).24
The possibility that a legal subject could operate as the owner of
multiple funds or patrimonies, which are committed to different groups of
creditors, without necessarily forming a new legal entity, is, in a nutshell,
what distinguishes the “asset independence” doctrine of civil law countries
from the affirmative asset partitioning doctrine developed in the United
States.
Even though the juridical person doctrine has been much less
influential in the United States than in Europe, American legal scholars
nevertheless seem unwilling to conceive of an asset partitioning effect
without the formation of a new legal entity.
According to Hansmann and Kraakman, a firm has two fundamental
attributes: a well-defined decision-making authority and the ability to bond
398-405. The benefits of defensive asset partitioning include reduction of monitoring costs
as well as providing economies of transfer and risk sharing. Id. at 423-27. See also
Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 9, at 1343-54 (describing the benefits of entity
shielding); Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, at 515 (examining the relationship between
economic integration and legal partitioning).
24. In Germany, this phenomenon is well-known as Zweckvermögenstheorie. ALOIS
BRINZ, LEHRBUCH DES PANDEKTENRECHT (2d ed. 1879); ERNST IMMANUEL BEKKER, SYSTEM
DES HEUTIGEN PANDEKTENRECHT (1886). In Italy, the contribution of FRANCESCO FERRARA,
TRATTATO DI DIRITTO CIVILE ITALIANO (1921) is fundamental.
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its contracts with an existing pool of assets.25 Since a natural person has
both these attributes, he or she can be defined as a firm. However, since a
natural person is liable for his or her contracts involving all of his or her
assets (personal liability), in order to insulate these assets from his personal
creditors and pledge them to a specified group, it is necessary to employ a
separate legal person. Accordingly, since a debt is a firm-wide obligation,26
if a firm wishes to separate its assets from the personal assets of its owners
and managers and commit them to a specific business purpose, it is
necessary to create a juridical person or a separate legal entity.27
Since the “firm’s boundaries define the set of assets that are subject
to the personal obligation of the firm to pay its debts,”28 if the individual or
juridical person (e.g., a corporation) wishes to shield some of its assets
from personal creditors and pledge them to a specified group of creditors, it
is necessary to create a new legal subject, thereby multiplying the number
of legal entities employed.29
In other words, according to this view, it is not possible to conceive
of a juridical person or an individual owning more than one pool of assets
without employing some kind of organizational form, since each separate
pool is itself a distinct legal entity.30 As a consequence, given that legal
entities incur debt on a firm-by-firm basis by pledging all their assets to
bond their contracts, affirmative asset partitioning is conceivable only
outside the boundaries of the same firm by partitioning assets among
multiple legal entities.31
This is not the lesson learned from the civil law tradition where, as
this Article will explain, it is possible to achieve affirmative asset
partitioning—or, to use a terminology closer to civil law, “asset
independence”—within the boundaries of the same legal entity.
The use of trust law certainly represents a boundary between common
law and civil law traditions surrounding affirmative asset partitioning, and
explains the divergence in the evolution of this doctrine. It is evident that
the existence of the trust device facilitated acceptance of the assets
partitioning principle by the common law tradition. In civil law countries,
on the other hand, this involved a complicated doctrinal debate that added
to the notion of partitioning the idea of the same patrimony for multiple and
25. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 391.
26. Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, at 529.
27. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 393, 416. The authors maintain that trustcreated affirmative asset partitioning creates functionally separate juridical persons.
28. Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, at 525.
29. Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 9, at 1337.
30. Accordingly, an individual can be considered the owner of distinct pools of assets
when he owns shares (and not the assets) of distinct legal entities, but cannot segregate his
own patrimony in different pools of assets without creating new legal entities.
31. Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, at 525.
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separate pools of assets. Conceptually, it is easier to conceive of asset
partitioning when it is achieved through transfer of assets to a different
entity (e.g., the trust), than when accomplished within the same patrimony.
Also, in civil law countries, the default rule governing the relations
between debtor and creditors is that all of a person's property (his or her
entire patrimony) is available for seizure and sale to satisfy the claims of
judgment creditors (so-called “universal patrimonial liability”).32
This principle was first introduced in modern codifications by Article
2092 of the French Code Napoléon,33 and can be found nowadays in many
civil codes such as the Italian Civil Code34 and the Civil Code of Québec.35
This principle resembles the concept of the firm-wide character of
debt examined with regard to the American debate on asset partitioning:
all of the debtor’s property represents the common pledge of creditors.
Nonetheless, in civil law countries, in addition to the principle of “universal
patrimonial liability,” the law expressly provides that, in a numerus clausus
of circumstances, a legal subject is allowed to make a division or
partitioning of his patrimony. As an illustration, Article 2645 of the Civil
Code of Québec states that the common pledge does not extend to
“property[,] which is the object of a division of patrimony permitted by
law”.36
In civil law countries, even if all the property normally constitutes the
only patrimony of an individual and is pledged to bond all his
performances, the law allows a legal subject to partition his patrimony
among several pools of assets without creating a new legal entity. In
particular, “asset independence” must be recognized when a pool of assets
is subtracted from the common pledge of personal creditors, and committed
to a specialized group. Consequently, each pool of assets is bonded to a
different purpose and pledged only to creditors whose claim is connected
with that purpose.37
32. Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 9, at 1337. The same is true for an
entrepreneur. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 407 (explaining the if there is
no contractual agreement to the contrary, an entrepreneur’s creditors have a right to attach
all of his or her assets).
33. Art. 2092 C. civ. (“Whoever is bound is held to fulfill that duty in dealing with all
fixed and liquid assets both now and in the future).
34. See Art. 2740 C.c. (“The debtor is responsible for his obligations with all his
present and future assets.”).
35. Art. 2644 Civil Code of Québec states that “The property of a debtor is charged
with the performance of his obligations and is the common pledge of creditors.” Art. 2645
Civil Code of Québec states that “Any person under a personal obligation charges, for its
performance, all his property, movable and immovable, present and future.”
36. Art. 2645 Civil Code of Québec.
37. For a description of “asset independence” in the Italian literature, see Durante,
Patrimonio (diritto civile), in 22 ENCICLOPEDIA GIURIDICA 1, 3 (1990) (describing the
purpose of “asset independence” and its most significant legal effects); Lina Bigliazzi Geri,
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What is clear from the studies of civil law scholars is that only the
law, through a property rule, is capable of achieving “asset independence.”
Accordingly, only in a numerus clausus of circumstances, provided by
property laws, is a legal subject able to partition his patrimony in separate
funds.38
It must be noted that these separate pools of assets are not considered
new legal entities. Therefore, the “asset independence” doctrine and
formation of a new legal entity represent alternative and sometimes
competing legal devices to achieve affirmative asset partitioning.
Unlike the practice followed in the United States, the “asset
independence” doctrine of the civil law tradition allows a legal subject to
accomplish a partitioning not only externally (through the formation of a
new legal entity), but also within the boundaries of the same legal subject.
This distinction is not merely semantic. As this Article will show, the
formation of a new legal entity and the articulation of a patrimony in
separate pools of assets are two distinct legal techniques. Both techniques
can result in affirmative asset partitioning, yet they are not equivalent in
terms of costs and benefits.
It is also worth clarifying why the “asset independence” of civil law
does not coincide with the floating lien device used in the United States. A
floating lien is a security interest that a creditor holds on a debtor’s set of
assets, and that covers any additional property obtained by the debtor. In
contrast to the creditor of a segregated pool of assets, the secured creditor
still has recourse as an unsecured creditor against the general patrimony of
the debtor (the assets not included in the floating lien). Furthermore, all of
the unsecured creditors have recourse against the assets covered by the
floating lien once the secured creditor has been fully paid. In short, neither
a defensive asset partitioning nor a strong affirmative asset partitioning is
achieved through a floating lien.39
The functional analysis conducted in Part IV will examine, from a
comparative perspective, a series of business transactions which, in order to
achieve their effects, require use of the affirmative asset partitioning
mechanism.
In particular, this Article will compare the common law and civil law
systems with regard to the use of a corporate subsidiary as opposed to the
Patrimonio autonomo e separato, in 32 ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO 280 (1982)
(summarizing the doctrine and its application); See FRÉDÉRIC H. SPETH, LA DIVISIBILITE DU
PATRIMOINE ET L'ENTREPRISE D'UNE PERSONNE (1957) (affirming the presence of “asset
independence” in French literature).
38. FERRARA, supra note 24, at 875.
39. On the notion of “floating lien,” see ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE
WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 633-36
(4th ed. 2001); STEVEN L. HARRIS & CHARLES W. MOONEY, JR., SECURITY INTERESTS IN
PERSONAL PROPERTY: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 469-76 (4th ed. 2005).
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use of “funds committed to a specific purpose” created within the
boundaries of the same legal entity; the regulation of asset securitization;
the organization of mutual funds; and the differences between trust law and
the recent regulation of fiduciary relations adopted by French legislators.
IV. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE ASSET PARTITIONING
DOCTRINE
A.

The Historical Evolution of the “Asset Independence” Doctrine in the
Civil Law Tradition
1.

The Unity and Indivisibility of the Patrimony Doctrine in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a metaphysical
concept of patrimony prevailed in civil law countries which conceived of
assets or property according to an anthropocentric vision. Viewed this
way, patrimony was the external manifestation of an individual and
tangible expression of the human personality. Patrimony, in other words,
was considered to represent nothing more than that same human
personality as related to objects. This idea, rooted in natural law,
developed out of the philosophical thought of the Enlightenment and the
Romantic Movements.40
Such an indissolvable bond between the
“individual and his patrimony shifted from a philosophical to a legal
doctrine during the first half of the nineteenth century.41 In that era,
patrimony was considered to be an attribute of the human personality.
Since human attributes were indivisible and intangible, the patrimony was
also considered indivisible and intangible. Since an individual had only
one personality, this meant, likewise, only one patrimony, which could not
be partitioned among distinct pools of assets (singleness of patrimony
doctrine).42

40. The idea that the bond between the individual and his patrimony is rooted in natural
law is pointed out by Francesco Ferrara, La teoria della persona giuridica, in RIVISTA DI
DIRITTO CIVILE 638, 664 (1911). In the French literature, see HEINRICH AHRENS, COURS DE
DROIT NATUREL OU DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT, COMPLETE, DANS LES PRINCIPALES MATIERES,
PAR DES APERÇUS HISTORIQUES ET POLITIQUES 71 (1892), where, adopting the absolute
idealist philosophy of Hegel, he says: “Thereafter, the law is developed through the various
degrees of the spirit’s objective reality. First, free will is manifested from an individual
standpoint, that is as a person; the liberty created by a person is property.”
41. This shift is normally ascribed to a French law handbook written by a German
scholar, K.S. Zachariae, and subsequently updated and augmented by two French scholars,
CHARLES AUBRY & CHARLES RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS, D'APRES L'OUVRAGE
DE M. C.S. ZACHARIE (1856-1858).
42. Id. at 573.
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The Estate as an Entity Doctrine and the Commitment of Assets
to a Specific Purpose

If an individual could only be the owner of one pool of assets, how did
civil law scholars justify those circumstances where the law conceived the
existence of autonomous pools of assets, committed to specific groups of
creditors?
It is worth mentioning three different cases in civil law systems that
serve as examples in which pools of assets are exclusively committed to
creditors whose claim is related to the same pool. First, in the civil law
tradition, inheritance law provides that if a devisee accepts the devise under
benefit of inventory (i.e., a public officer is in charge of singling out and
describing the property of the decedent), he is not personally liable for the
decedent’s debts (defensive asset partitioning). Also, his personal creditors
hold junior claims to the probate estate that are subordinate to the senior
claims of decedent’s creditors (weak affirmative asset partitioning).
Second, Italian family law provides that spouses, together or separately,
can constitute a “family fund” whose assets are committed to satisfy the
family’s needs. Spouses’ creditors who are aware that their claim is related
to a purpose different from the family’s need have no recourse against the
assets of the “family fund” (affirmative asset partitioning).43 Third, in the
absence of trust law, civil law countries expressly regulate special funds
committed to pension purposes. In particular, the employer has to maintain
a portion of his/her employees’ salary and assign this portion to the special
funds. The assets of these funds are separate from the general patrimony of
the employer, and are unavailable to satisfy the employer's obligations to
his personal creditors (affirmative asset partitioning).44
In the late nineteenth century, German and Italian scholars developed
two different theories to justify the legal existence of pools of assets that,
because they were committed to a specific purpose and pledged to a
specified group of creditors, were separate from the general patrimony of
an individual.
According to the first theory, since an individual can be the owner of
only one patrimony, any time the law provides for the existence of an
autonomous pool of assets, the legal system introduces a new patrimony
that has no owner. The specific purpose to which the assets are committed
assures unity in this autonomous patrimony.45
43. In Italy, the “family fund” is currently regulated by arts. 167-171 of the Italian Civil
Code.
44. In Italy, the partitioning between the pension funds created by employers and their
general patrimony is provided by art. 2117 of the Italian Civil Code.
45. BRINZ, supra note 24, at 202. In Italy, this theory, first developed in Germany, has
been further analyzed by Gustavo Bonelli, La teoria della persona giuridica, in RIVISTA DI
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According to the second theory, any time the law provides for the
existence of a pool of assets that is separate from the general patrimony of
the individual, the legal system recognizes the presence of a new legal
entity. If any separate pool of assets is considered a distinct legal entity,
the idea that each individual can be the owner of only one patrimony is
preserved.46
If an individual has only one patrimony, then in order to partition his
assets he can only participate as a residual claimant to the ownership of a
distinct legal entity. This latter theory recalls the view held by common
law scholars examined above, according to which the estate separateness
doctrine is absorbed into the concept of a juridical person.47
3.

The Substitution of the Indivisibility of the Patrimony Doctrine
with the Numerus Clausus of “Asset Independence” Principle

In the early twentieth century, civil law scholars began to question the
singleness and indivisibility of patrimony doctrine (i.e., an individual can
be the owner of one and only one patrimony, which cannot be partitioned
in separate pools without the creation of a new legal entity). The basis of
this approach—the metaphysical conjunction between the human
personality and its patrimony—was increasingly rejected by scholars.48
At this stage, assets were no longer viewed as an external expression
of an individual. This is reflected by the very simple objection to the
singleness of patrimony doctrine: what is single and indivisible is not the
patrimony itself, but rather the right to have a patrimony, which belongs to
any individual as an external expression of his personality. As a
consequence of this new viewpoint, an individual was no longer identified
with his patrimony, nor was the latter considered a unique attribute of the

DIRITTO CIVILE, 445-508, 593-673 (1910).
46. Id. at 657-58.
47. A juridical person is traditionally defined as a legal subject distinct from the
individuals who compose or promote it. As a distinct legal subject, a juridical person may
have its own legal relations with third parties, exercised through organs whose activity is not
attributed to the individuals, but directly attributed to that juridical person. Therefore, it is
the juridical person, not its members, that enters into a contract, undertakes an obligation,
acquires a claim, is summoned before a court, or brings a suit against a third party. In the
civil law tradition, there are different theories that try to explain this concept: One, the
juridical person is a fiction: for economic and functional purposes, the legal system created
the fictional subjectivity of entities different from individuals. Two, the juridical person as
reality: the legal system simply recognizes a phenomenon that exists in social life. Three,
the juridical person as a device of legal language: the juridical person is only a legal term
used to summarize a complex body of legal rules regulating relations between individuals
(this can be likened to the “nexus of contracts” theory of the firm). See Ferrara, supra note
40, passim (discussing the concept of the juridical person in the civil law tradition).
48. Id. at 665, 675.
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human personality.49
Since the patrimony is no longer necessarily indivisible, it is also no
longer necessary to recognize a new legal entity each time the law provides
for autonomous pools of assets. At this stage, scholars began to
acknowledge the possibility that a legal subject can be the owner of
multiple, separate pools of assets, each one committed to different purposes
and pledged to a specified group of creditors (“asset independence”
doctrine). In its acknowledgment that a legal subject can be the owner of
multiple funds, the “asset independence” doctrine reacquires its force from
the juridical person concept.
What is clear from civil law scholars’ studies is that only the law,
through a property rule, is capable of achieving “asset independence.”
Accordingly, only in a numerus clausus of circumstances, provided by
property law, is a legal subject able to partition his patrimony in separate
funds.50
In the light of this historical evolution of the concept of patrimony, the
default rule adopted in civil law countries regulating the relations between
debtors and creditors becomes more clear. On one side, there is a universal
patrimonial liability (which stems from the idea of the indivisibility of the
patrimony) and, on the other side, there is the possibility that only property
law allows a division through a partitioning of the patrimony itself.51
B.

The Historical Evolution of Affirmative Asset Partitioning in the
United States

In civil law countries, the modern concept of asset partitioning has its
origins in the early nineteenth century. During that period, demand
increased for business organizations that were able to separate the firm’s
assets from the owners’ personal assets.52 The ability to commit assets to a
specific business purpose, without the threat of the firm’s assets being
liquidated either by an owner or his personal creditors, was regarded as a
fundamental attribute for businesses of substantial dimensions.53

49. Id. at 665-80; NICOLA COVIELLO, MANUALE DI DIRITTO CIVILE ITALIANO: PARTE
GENERALE 252 (4th ed. 1929).
50. FERRARA, supra note 24, at 875.
51. It would be useful to read Art. 2645 of the Civil Code of Québec once again, in light
of what has just been described: “Any person under a personal obligation charges, for its
performance, all his property, movable and immovable, present and future, except property .
. . which is the object of a division of patrimony permitted by law.”
52. See Blair, supra note 5, at 413 (describing efforts in the nineteenth century to
strengthen business institutions through the creation of joint stock companies and specially
chartered corporations).
53. The restriction on the ability of a firm’s owners “to force the payout of an owner’s
share of the firm’s net assets” has been referred to by some authors as “liquidation
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In the nineteenth century, before corporate charters were issued on a
widespread basis in the U.S., attempts to achieve affirmative asset
partitioning were made where there was a compelling necessity to gather
significant capital assets.
In the seventeenth century, two key
developments in this direction occurred in England: 1) in 1683, the
Chancery Court ruled that partnership creditors enjoy priority over
partners’ personal creditors in the event of a bankrupt partnership (weak
affirmative asset partitioning);54 and 2) the English Crown began granting
charters to joint stock companies in order to assure an existence longer than
a single trade mission for these companies.55 To compensate the
restrictions on merchants to withdraw their capital at the end of each
voyage, the right to sell shares of the company without the consent of other
owners was introduced.56
In the eighteenth century, because the English Parliament only granted
a limited number of charters, merchants and other business people tried to
achieve affirmative asset partitioning through partnership and trust law.
The unincorporated joint stock company became the entity used by
merchants to accomplish both affirmative asset partitioning and share
tradability.57 The latter was achieved through complex contract clauses and
the former by placing the assets into a trust.58 Only in 1844 did the English
Parliament enact a statute admitting incorporation as a general right.59
In the first half of the nineteenth century in the U.S., incorporation
was still restricted to a fixed range of business purposes. In order to
achieve affirmative asset partitioning, business people used unincorporated
joint stock companies together with trust law.60 Despite the fact that many
states passed general incorporation statutes during this time period, in the
early twentieth century, the use of the trust—in particular, the business trust
(also known as the Massachusetts trust)—was a strong competitor to the
corporation in this regard.61
protection.” Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 9, at 1338 (citing Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra note 2, at 403-04). This method has also been referred to as “locking in
capital.” Blair, supra note 5, at 387.
54. Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 9, at 1381 (citing (1683) 21 Eng. Rep.
664 (ch.)).
55. Id. at 1376-77.
56. Id.
57. Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 9, at 1383-84.
58. Blair, supra note 5, at 414–16; Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 9, at
1383. Merchant law has been viewed as “an excellent place to look for voluntary solutions
to asset partitioning problems . . . .” Mahoney, supra note 5, at 880.
59. Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 9, at 1386.
60. Blair, supra note 5, at 414.
61. “Trust’s salience as a form of business organization during this era explains why
today we have antitrust law, not competition or monopoly law, as it is known abroad.”
Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust as “Uncorporation”: A Research Agenda, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 31,
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The use of trust law represents a boundary between common law and
civil law traditions on affirmative asset partitioning and explains the
differences in the evolution of this doctrine. The existence of the trust
device facilitated the acceptance of the “asset independence” principle in
the common law tradition. In the civil law countries, on the other hand, a
complicated doctrinal debate was required in order to establish the practice
of partitioning the same patrimony in multiple and separate pools of assets.
Intuitively, it is easier to conceive of asset partitioning when it is achieved
through transfers of assets to a different entity (e.g., the trust), than when it
is accomplished within the same patrimony.
The rise of the corporate form as a general device to achieve asset
partitioning has been a subject of great interest to many American scholars.
However, some have neglected to explain why, in operating enterprises,
corporations have prevailed over statutory business trusts that are used only
in specific cases, such as mutual funds and structured finance.62
The history of asset partitioning and the differences between the
common law and civil law systems in this area set the framework for
understanding why these two legal systems employ different devices in
important business transactions where affirmative asset partitioning is
required.
V.

AFFIRMATIVE ASSET PARTITIONING AND “ASSET INDEPENDENCE”: A
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS

As explained above, while in the U.S. scholars consider affirmative
asset partitioning to represent one—and, according to the most recent
studies, the most significant—characteristic of a juridical person63 (together
with limited liability, perpetual life, centralized management and free
tradability of shares), in civil law countries there is a clear distinction
between the concepts of “asset independence” (which can be likened to the
concept of affirmative asset partitioning) and the juridical person.

32 (2005).
62. Id. at 42–44. While there are benefits to some of the empirical data already
discovered, there are overarching concerns. In particular, when discussing the success of
corporations relative to trusts by only highlighting the fact that in the twentieth century
regulatory limits in state corporate codes disappeared, there is a presumption of superiority
of the corporate form in the absence of any real explanation.
63. John Armour & Michael J. Whincop, The Proprietary Foundations of Corporate
Law, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 429 (2007); Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What
Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L.
REV. 387 (2003); Edward M. Iacobucci & George G. Triantis, Economic and Legal
Boundaries of Firms, 93 VA. L. REV. 515 (2007); Paul G. Mahoney, Contract or
Concession? An Essay on the History of Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 873 (2000); Lynn
A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, U. ILL. L. REV. 253 (2005).
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This distinction has practical consequences, and is not merely
semantic. A comparative analysis of different asset partitioning devices is
conducted in this section in order to understand the economics of
affirmative asset partitioning through the use of a new legal entity, as
opposed to doing so through a property law granting “asset independence”
within the boundaries of the same entity.
A.

The “Funds Committed to a Specific Purpose” of the Italian Civil
Code v. a Corporate Subsidiary
1.

Preliminary Considerations

In a recent study, Edward M. Iacobucci and George C. Triantis
presented a general capital-structure theory for the legal partitioning of
assets. They explored when it is more efficient to partition assets into
distinct organizations and achieve the efficiency gains that result from
tailoring as compared to cases where it is more efficient to group assets
within a single entity to benefit from the economies deriving from
integration. In keeping with the affirmative asset partitioning doctrine, the
analysis is conducted based on the assumption that a debt is always a firmwide obligation and that partitioning can be achieved only through the
formation of multiple legal entities.64
According to this logic, since it is not possible to accomplish a
partitioning of assets within the same entity, there is a consequential tradeoff between the efficiency gains that result from asset partitioning and the
economies that derive from integration into a single entity. This conclusion
does not appear to be necessarily true in a civil law country where the
foundational legal principle of this analysis has been disproven.
The “asset independence” doctrine allows a legal subject to partition
its assets within its own boundaries, enabling a firm to limit its obligation
to a subset of its assets without having to form a new legal entity. Thus, a
firm could avoid the trade-off described by Iacobucci and Triantis by
64. In particular, Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, assume that a subdivision of a
person may not own property:
[A] corporation is a legal person that may own property, but a division or
branch of the corporation may not. . . . Although the corporation itself might
enter into a contract that attempts to limit its exposure to only a subset of its
assets, we show that such segmentation is difficult to achieve under current law.
. . . To fully match groups of assets with appropriate financing and governance
features, an entrepreneur . . . must partition the groups into distinct entities. . . .
The practical consequence of legal restrictions on asset-specific financing is that
entrepreneurs and managers seeking to tailor financial and governance rights to
different asset types must do so outside corporate boundaries by partitioning
assets among multiple firms. Id. at 518–20.
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simultaneously achieving the benefits of partitioning and maintaining the
economies of integration.
2.

The Italian “Committed Funds”

The clearest example of this approach is the regulation of the “funds
committed to a specific purpose” introduced in 2003 into the Italian Civil
Code by arts. 2447 bis - 2447 decies.65
This set of rules provides that a corporation may partition up to 10
percent of its assets in order to commit it to a specific business purpose.
This separate fund is pledged only to those creditors whose claim is related
to the specific purpose (“specialized creditors”), while the “general
creditors” have no recourse against these assets (affirmative asset
partitioning). Meanwhile, the firm’s assets that are not committed to the
specific business purpose and are not part of the committed fund are
protected from each group of specialized creditors (defensive asset
partitioning).66
Through a property law which is “good against the world,”67 the
Italian Civil Code allows a corporation to partition its assets into different
pools (a general one, and one or more that are committed to a specific
purpose) and to distinguish its creditors in different categories (“general
creditors” and “specialized creditors”) without creating a new legal entity
(e.g., a corporate subsidiary).68
The correct way of analyzing this legal device, imposed by the Italian
Civil Code, from a cost and benefit perspective is to make a comparison
with its closest functional equivalent: the corporate subsidiary. In
particular, there is significance in exploring differences, if any, between
achieving the affirmative asset partitioning within the boundaries of the
same entity (committed funds) and achieving the partitioning through the
formation of a new legal entity (corporate subsidiary).

65. C.C. art. 2447 bis–2447 decies.
66. The asset partitioning effect is regulated by C.c. art. 2447 quinquies.
67. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened To Property In
Law And Economics, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 358 (2001).
68. This legal device has captured the attention of several corporate scholars in Italy.
Among the many authors on this subject, see Andrea Zoppini, Autonomia e separazione del
patrimonio, nella prospettiva dei patrimoni separati della società per azioni, 48 RIVISTA DI
DIRITTO CIVILE 545 (2002) (comparing the partitioning of assets with the effects of
incorporation), Gianvito Giannelli, Commentary, Artt. 2447 bis - 2447 decies c.c., in 2
SOCIETÀ DI CAPITALI: COMMENTARIO 1210 (Giuseppe Niccolini & Alberto Stagno
d’Alcontres eds. 2004) (distinguishing committed funds from other types of asset divisions).
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Lower Monitoring Costs

Both the committed fund and corporate subsidiary are able to pledge
separate pools of assets to specific lines of business. In both cases,
affirmative asset partitioning enables a corporation to group its creditors
into distinct categories, defined only by those assets committed to a
specific line of business. Since each group of creditors is not concerned
with the success of other lines of business and is instead exploiting its
monitoring specialties, a lower cost of credit is achieved.69
4.

Matching Capital Structure and Asset Type

The possibility of moving assets into a separate pool or into a
corporate subsidiary facilitates a better match between capital structure and
the nature of the assets. If two asset groups differ in certain aspects,
corporate finance literature has argued that it is efficient to locate these
assets in distinct corporations so that the optimal capital structure between
debt financing and equity financing can be achieved.70 Since regulation of
committed funds provides that the corporation can issue different securities
for each fund (i.e., securities that are only attached to the specific assets
committed to the fund), in the Italian legal system it seems plausible to
argue that an optimal capital structure can be achieved without the
formation of different legal entities.71
5.

Agency Costs

Integrating several lines of business into a unitary entity poses a
managerial agency cost. In an internal market, managers “may allocate
resources so as to enhance their private benefits rather than overall
profitability.”72 To limit opportunistic behavior by management, the
69. This topic has been discussed in various articles. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman,
supra note 1, at 399-401 (exploring the advantages of sub-partitioning assets and lines of
business within a company by creating corporate subsidiaries); Hansmann, Kraakman &
Squire, supra note 9, at 1344-45 (using a hypothetical situation to demonstrate how entity
shielding may reduce monitoring costs incurred by creditors).
70. Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, at 523, 544.
71. The majority interpretation of the Italian Civil Code art. 2447-ter (e), which allows
a corporation to issue asset-specific securities, argues that a corporation can issue common
stocks that attach to the committed fund’s assets, debt securities and hybrid securities. See
Carlo Comporti, Commento all’ articolo 2447 ter Cod. civ., in 2 LA RIFORMA DELLE
SOCIETÀ 973-975 (Michele Sandulli & Vittorio Santoro eds. 2003).
72. Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, at 562. See also George G. Triantis,
Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral,
and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1123-26
(2004) (exploring the effects and corporate boundaries related to the control of liquidity
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formation of a corporate subsidiary has been proposed as a possible
solution.73 While in a single corporation a director’s decisions are
protected by the business judgment rule in order to make it more difficult to
second-guess transfers of assets between different lines of business, in a
parent-subsidiary structure, minority shareholders can challenge such
transfers by designating them as related-party transactions which need to be
intrinsically fair. Where the parent wholly owns the subsidiary such that
there are no minority shareholders, creditors of that subsidiary can, through
covenants, restrict the shifting of capital between the two entities.74
Even if the partitioning of assets between two entities reduces the risk
of opportunistic behavior, a parent-subsidiary structure or a group of
subsidiaries under common control will not be able to completely eliminate
managerial agency costs.
At first glance, the committed funds device creates a greater risk for
opportunistic asset shifting since the fund is managed by the same directors
as the corporation. However, a fundamental aspect of this legal device is
that the assets of committed funds must be registered in public records as
being bound to a specific purpose.75 If real property is committed to a
separate fund, the fund’s specific purpose must be registered in the same
public record where the real property is registered.76 With regard to
personal property, the resolution constituting the committed fund must
report all assets that are part of the fund and the resolution must be
registered in the same public record where the corporation is recorded.77
Since the commitment to a specific purpose is made public (i.e., “good
against the world”), any use of the committed assets contrary to the specific
purpose (i.e., ultra vires) is considered void.78 Thus, the committed funds
device appears to be a more effective solution to the managerial agency
problem than the formation of a corporate subsidiary.79

within a corporation).
73. Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, at 561.
74. Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, at 563.
75. C.C. art. 2447 quinquies, co. 2 (It.).
76. See id. (stating that “[t]he resolution must be deposited and filed according to art.
2436 c.c.,” which provides that the notary overviewing the resolution must file the
resolution in the firm’s public record).
77. See C.C. art. 2447 ter (b) and 2447 quater co. 1 (It.)
78. Giannelli, supra note 68, at 1243-46.
79. Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 9, at 1346. In an internal market,
managers could be tempted to borrow too much since they can bond the assets of the whole
entity. Asset partitioning reduces this risk, since managers will be able to borrow only
against the assets of the separate entity. With regard to this agency problem, corporate
subsidiaries and committed funds appear to be perfectly equivalent solutions.
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Value of Switching Options and Hold-Up Problem

Resolving the management agency cost associated with asset shifting
imposes an inversely correlated cost where once a pool of assets has been
allocated to a separate legal entity it becomes costly to reallocate capital
among different projects. The reason is that, while managers of a single
entity can readily redeploy capital by authority, two separate entities must
enter into a contract and bear the transaction costs of moving capital
between projects.
Both the corporate subsidiary and committed funds reduce the value
of “switching options.” However, this value is enhanced when the
managers are free to switch capital between ventures.80 With a corporate
subsidiary format the two legal entities have to enter into a contract to
capture the surplus generated by their synergy, but managers of committed
funds do not have such a requirement. Managers of corporate subsidiaries,
though, may not redeploy assets when the new use is inconsistent with the
purpose originally pursued by the funds.
In both cases, it is plausible that some stakeholders will make the
opportunistic attempt to hold-up the transaction over the surplus generated
by the synergy.81 In the case of the parent subsidiary structure, the minority
shareholders can threaten the parent company with a challenge to the
contract as a related-party transaction.82 Creditors of a committed funds
structure can threaten to challenge the decision of the management as one
contrary to the specific purpose of the fund.83 Unlike a committed fund, a
wholly-owned subsidiary is not able to overcome these costs of
partitioning.84 “If a parent attempts to strengthen, ex ante, its control over a
subsidiary in order to avoid transaction costs and hold-up activity, it invites
judicial veil piercing or enterprise liability under state corporate law or
substantive consolidation in bankruptcy.”85
7.

Tracking of Value

Securities rights are attached to all of a corporation’s property, not to
specific assets.86 In order to track the progress of a particular asset,
corporations can issue tracking stocks that try to reflect the asset’s value.87
80. Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, at 521-23, 561-63; Triantis, supra note 72, at
1105-06.
81. Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, at 561-63.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 563.
86. Id. at 535.
87. Id. at 536-37.
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The effectiveness of tracking stocks is limited by two factors: 1) the
inability of directors to “announce a dividend payable out of the profits of a
single division if the firm as a whole has failed to meet the statutory
threshold” (a minimum capital surplus); and 2) the inability to link a
tracking stock’s dissolution rights to the tracked assets rather than to the
value of the entire firm.88
To overcome these limitations, a corporation can establish a distinct
legal entity to oversee a specific line of business. In such a case, securities
rights are attached only to assets related to the specific business venture.89
Committed funds enable firms to overcome the limitations of tracking
stocks by permitting the firms to issue asset-specific securities. As a result,
dividends are payable only by considering the profits of the separate fund,
and upon dissolution, the stockholders of the asset-specific securities
receive a fraction of the value of the fund without sharing the losses
suffered by the general patrimony of the firm.90 Therefore, the residual
claims of asset-specific stockholders are linked only to the assets of the
tracked fund. This legal device enables a corporation to achieve the benefit
of partitioning without the costs of establishing a new legal entity.
8.

The Asset Partitioning Effect

As explained earlier, both a committed fund and a corporate
subsidiary can accomplish affirmative asset partitioning. While the
subsidiary achieves what has been called “strong entity shielding,” the
committed fund accomplishes what has been called “complete entity
shielding.”91
Strong entity shielding restricts the ability of both shareholders and
their personal creditors to seize the assets of the corporation.92 However,
the shares of a corporate subsidiary also represent an asset of the parent
corporation. This creates a paradoxical situation where, on the one hand,
creditors cannot seize the subsidiary’s assets, but on the other hand,
creditors can still seize the shares of the subsidiary and, if the seized shares
constitute the majority, the creditors can force the subsidiary’s liquidation.
In contrast, a committed fund creates an effective wall between the
corporation’s general creditors (corresponding to the parent corporation’s
creditors) and the assets transferred into the fund. The corporation does not
own any share representing the fund so any claim to those assets is
88. Id. at 535-37.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 9, at 1337-38 (stating that the
phrase “entity shielding” is the equivalent of affirmative asset partitioning).
92. Id.
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denied.93 At the same time, asset partitioning through committed funds
resembles that which is achieved in the U.S. through a trust. Thus, the
relative costs and benefits of this solution are debatable.
9.

Informational Economies

Partitioning allows firms to attract investors with specialized expertise
in particular assets. Segregating these investors’ assets from the rest of the
patrimony lowers investigation and monitoring costs.94 Similarly, some
investors may wish to invest in multiple groups of assets. Integrating these
assets into the same entity has the advantage of creating information
economies of scale. Investors dealing with a single entity only need to
investigate the structure of one board of directors, one set of takeover
defenses, and one corporate governance structure.95
In a system that conceives affirmative asset partitioning only through
the formation of a new legal entity, there is a trade-off between the costs
avoided through asset partitioning (lower monitoring costs for specialized
creditors) and the benefits achieved through legal integration (information
economies of scale). The use of committed funds can overcome this tradeoff. Committed funds allow a corporation to attract investors with
specialized expertise who are willing to invest in particular assets bound to
a specific purpose. At the same time, maintaining the corporation’s unity
creates information economies of scale and attracts those investors seeking
the benefits of diversification.
B.

Asset Securitization
1.

Overview of Asset Securitization

In a typical asset securitization transaction, a corporation (the
originator) transfers some of its assets (normally the receivables) to a
distinct legal entity (the special purpose vehicle or SPV)that is either a new
corporation or a trust.96 The SPV issues securities backed by the
receivables and uses the raised capital to pay the originator the price of the
receivables.97
Through such a transaction, the originator is able to separate the risk
associated with its general activity from the risk associated with the
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1344-45.
95. Id. at 1343-48.
96. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
133, 135-36 (1994).
97. Id.
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receivables.98 Since the receivables are transferred to the SPV, investors
are concerned only with the securitized assets and not with the general
financial condition of the originator.99 Asset securitization accomplishes an
asset partitioning which is affirmative and defensive. The originator’s
creditors have no claims against the receivables that have been sold to a
third party and pledged to the exclusive satisfaction of the investors
(affirmative asset partitioning).100 The investors, meanwhile, as creditors of
the SPV, cannot seize any assets of the originator (defensive asset
partitioning).101
The partitioning of assets between two distinct legal entities also
enables the originator to lower the cost of credit. Since the SPV, also
called a “bankruptcy remote” vehicle, is unaffected by the originator’s
incidental bankruptcy, investors are willing to pay a higher price for
securitized assets.102
In light of the discussion above, it is not surprising that, in the United
States, asset securitization accomplishes partitioning through the formation
of a new legal entity.103 The originator often creates a separate entity
(either a corporation or a trust) for each securitization transaction to avoid
co-mingling asset pools related to different transactions. The logic of
achieving asset partitioning through duplication of legal entities is therefore
corroborated.104
2.

Asset Securitization in Italy

The regulation of asset securitization in Italy offers another example
of the “asset independence” doctrine or, put differently, an affirmative asset
partitioning achieved within the boundaries of the same entity.
Law No. 130 of April 30, 1999 provides two different possibilities for
achieving asset securitization. The first possibility is reminiscent of the
scheme described above with regard to the United States, and it is
accomplished through the formation of an SPV, typically as a new
corporation.105 The second possibility allows a corporation to perform an

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. For a discussion on “affirmative asset partitioning,” see Hansmann & Kraakman,
supra note 2, at 394-95.
101. “For a discussion on “defensive asset partitioning,” see Hansmann & Kraakman,
supra note 2, at 395-96.”
102. Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: a Comparative
Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 468 (1998).
103. See Schwarcz, supra note 96, at 136–144 (examining the structure and benefits of
asset securitization).
104. Id.
105. Law No. 130 of April 30, 1999, art. 3.
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asset securitization, then transfer the receivables to a mutual fund.106
With regard to the first scheme, Italian regulation provides for
different levels of asset partitioning. First, the SPV, a new legal entity,
creates segregation between the general assets of the originator and the
securitized assets. Second, and more significantly, a property law provides
for two additional levels of partitioning: 1) between the incidental personal
assets of the SPV and the receivables (“vertical partitioning”);107 and 2)
between different pools of securitized assets, each related to different
transactions (“horizontal partitioning”).108
In Italy, the SPV is normally organized as a corporation. In addition
to the securitized property, the special entity owns the legal capital required
by law. Having its own patrimony in addition to the pool of securitized
assets implies that an SPV engages in a managing activity and undertakes
obligations with third parties different from the securities holders. As
described above, a property law is intended to insulate the securitized
assets of the SPV from its personal creditors, thereby departing from the
principle that a debt is necessarily a firm-wide obligation and that
partitioning can be achieved only through the formation of multiple legal
entities.
The law grants segregation not only between the SPV assets and
receivables, but also between different pools of securitized assets that are
held by the same SPV but related to different transactions. The segregation
between these asset pools is thus achieved within the boundaries of a single
SPV, avoiding the creation of multiple legal entities.
3.

Asset Securitization in the United States

In the United States, in order to avoid the SPV’s pledging the
securitized property to bond obligations different from the ones undertaken
with securities holders, its business purpose is limited to owning and
operating the pool of securitized assets; no new property may be acquired.
Furthermore, the SPV is prevented from incurring additional debt.
In the United States, to reinforce the segregation between claims by
different categories of creditors, it is common to organize the SPV in the
form of a trust.109 The receivables are committed to the trust fund, and they
106. Id., art. 7, ¶ 1.
107. Id., art. 3, ¶ 2.
108. Id. Whether these pools were commingled in a single patrimony, investors with
different degrees of risk would be exposed to the outcomes of others’ portfolios. Without a
property law that grants horizontal partitioning, an originator would need to create a new
SPV for each asset securitization transaction.
109. See, e.g., David Hayton, The Uses of Trusts in the Commercial Context, in MODERN
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TRUST LAW 145 (1999) (discussing the various uses of
trusts to protect assets).
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are consequently insulated from claims of the settlor (the originator) and
claims of the trustee’s (the SPV’s) personal creditors. While the
originator’s personal creditors cannot seize the trust fund because it is
owned by a third party (the trustee),110 in the common law of trusts, if the
trustee becomes insolvent, the trust property he or she administers is
unavailable to satisfy the trustee’s obligations to his or her personal
creditors.111
4.

The Case of Multiple Transactions

As mentioned above, the Italian legal system provides that, in the case
of multiple asset securitization transactions, the same entity can hold
different and separate pools of assets. A property law ensures that each
pool of receivables is committed only to the corresponding group of
securities holders.
It is important to distinguish the case of multiple, separate, and
unrelated transactions under one SPV from the multiple issue of certificates
under the master trust that is common practice in the United States. In the
latter case, when a corporation or a financial institution has a substantial
amount of receivables that belong to the same category, and are therefore
difficult to separate in order to obtain a different rating, a practical solution
is for the corporation to transfer these receivables to a master trust (an
SPV). This trust will then issue different classes of trust certificates at
different points in time. Each class of certificates can be fashioned in a
distinct way, with different substantive rights (e.g., different interest rates)
and diversified subordination rights.112
Even though a series of covenants and subordination agreements are
designed to keep each class of certificates separate, it must be stressed that
each debt assumed by the master trust is a firm-wide obligation; that is, all
the receivables of the trust fund are the common pledge of all investors.
110. This is true to the extent that the substantive consolidation doctrine does not apply
in the event of the originator’s bankruptcy. According to this doctrine, all assets and
liabilities of two different entities are consolidated as if they were one entity. As a
consequence, the originator’s personal creditors can seize the receivables transferred to the
SPV. This doctrine applies after the court’s consideration of several factors including: (1)
presence or absence of consolidated financial statements; (2) unity of interests and
ownership between the various corporate entities; (3) existence of parent and inter-corporate
guarantees on loans; (4) degree of difficulty in segregating and ascertaining individual assets
and liability; (5) existence of transfers of assets without the observance of corporate
formalities; (6) commingling of assets and business functions; and (7) profitability of
consolidation at a single physical location. In re Vecco Construction Industries, Inc., 4 B.R.
407, 410 [Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980].
111. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 21, at 141.
112. See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ & ADAM D. FORD, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION, 3.18 (3rd. ed. 2003) (explaining the master trust).
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Therefore, each claim is backed by the same pool of receivables. It is true
that a junior investor only has recourse against the pool of assets that
remains after senior creditors have been fully paid. Since all receivables
are in the same pool of assets, if the trustee breaches a covenant or does not
respect the seniority of one class of certificates, senior investors will have
only contractual remedies at their disposal.
To be sure that each class of investors is completely shielded by the
others’ claims, the SPV must hold wholly separate pools of assets
containing separate classes of securities for each pool. Under the same
SPV, multiple transactions must be structured so that securities backed by
one pool do not have rights to other pools. This outcome would be
especially complicated were there not a statutory rule to enable asset
partitioning within the boundaries of the same entity.113 In the absence of a
property law ensuring that different pools of assets under one entity are
kept wholly separate, it would be necessary for an SPV to negotiate a
waiver with each investor to seize the assets of a pool backing a separate
class of securities. Making certain that each investor accepts this waiver
would not only raise transaction costs, but would simultaneously impose
higher monitoring costs on other investors, since the contractual nature of
such an agreement exposes it to moral hazard and potential breaches.
The practical response to these difficulties of realizing separate and
unrelated transactions under one issuing entity is to create multiple issuing
entities, each related to a different category of investors. Once again, the
common law experience seems to confirm the general principle that distinct
pools of assets are conceivable only as separate legal entities.
5.

Cost and Benefit Comparison of the Two Systems

Describing the differences between the Italian and American legal
systems with regard to asset securitization is not only a theoretical exercise,
but reveals different functional outcomes.
The possibility of an SPV’s holding multiple and wholly separate
pools of assets, each backing a different asset securitization transaction, has
been identified by representatives of U.S. issuers as a way to reduce the
costs of creating multiple issuing entities.114 On the other hand, the lack of

113. On this reasoning, see supra Part II.
114. Practicing Law Institute, Tax Classification of Segregated Portfolio Companies,
869 PLI/Tax 381, 390-91 (May-June 2009).
It often happens that an investment bank or other sponsor wishes to create, for
sale to investors, debt or equity securities that are backed by identified assets.
For repeat business with various asset pools and investors, it is cheaper, easier
and quicker to use as the securities issuer segregated portfolios within a single
company rather than multiple companies. Companies need to be formed and
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a property law in the United States that would grant an affirmative asset
partitioning within the same entity imposes this result only through a
complex series of covenants and subordination agreements. Consequently,
it seems reasonable to conclude that the transaction costs of managing
multiple asset securitization transactions within one SPV outweigh the
benefits of not having to create multiple issuing entities.115
As described above, the Italian legal system provides that an SPV can
hold multiple, wholly separate pools of assets backing different asset
securitization transactions. Article 3, paragraph 2 of Law No. 130 of April
30, 1999 provides that each pool of assets is segregated from both the
SPV’s legal capital required by law and from other pools committed to a
different asset securitization transaction.
This law means that each investor, in the absence of his previous
consent, has limited recourse against the pool of assets corresponding to his
transaction; therefore, he is banned from seizing either assets of the
corporation’s patrimony (normally corresponding to the minimum legal
capital required by law) or assets committed to different categories of
investors. Essentially, this property law reduces the transaction costs of
asset partitioning compared with the partitioning achieved either through a
complex series of waivers, covenants and subordination agreements, or by
multiplying legal entities.
Nonetheless, this legal structure is not free of risk. As is the case in
the United States, the SPV’s business purpose is limited to operating the
pool of securitized assets.116 Unlike the United States, however, its
patrimony is not limited to securitized assets; in fact, each SPV is
compelled to own the minimum legal capital required by law. Therefore, it
will be engaged not only in asset securitization transactions but, at the same
cared for. They must have a board of directors or managers and stockholder or
member meetings. It is better to form a company once rather than 100 times if
there is a commercial desire to create 100 series of securities backed by distinct
asset pools. Id.
115. See PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, NUTS & BOLTS OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS:
UNDERSTANDING THE EVOLVING WORLD OF CAPITAL MARKET & INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
PRODUCTS 115 (2007)
[T]he more fundamental issue with the use of multiple, separate and unrelated
transactions under one issuing entity for asset-backed securities is that it raises
concerns that deviate from the core principle that investors of a particular assetbacked security should look solely to the related pool of assets for primary
repayment. With a series trust structure, instead of only analyzing the particular
pool, an investor also may need to analyze any effect on its security, including
bankruptcy remoteness issues, if problems were to arise in another wholly
separate and unrelated transaction in the same issuing entity. These concerns
are exacerbated if new unrelated transactions are created after the original
transaction involving the investor.
116. Law No. 130 of April 30, 1999, art. 3, ¶ 1.
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time, in managing its own patrimony. The latter activity implies the
possibility of undertaking obligations with third parties, and therefore also
involves reducing the bankruptcy remoteness of these entities.
Even if the property law described above successfully segregates the
corporation’s patrimony from the other pools of assets, the managerial
activity of this patrimony increases the risk of commingling different funds,
as well as the chance of default.117 On this point, the U.S. approach seems
to lower the risks of commingling and defaulting. In fact, especially when
the SPV is structured as a trust, trust law ensures that trust property is
unavailable to satisfy the trustee's obligations to his personal creditors.
Furthermore, the fact that the trust is limited not only in its business
purpose but also in the sense of owning only the securitized assets reduces
the risk of undertaking and defaulting on obligations with third parties.118
Asset securitization represents another example of the dichotomy
between common law and civil law countries regarding asset partitioning.
The alternative between performing multiple but separate asset
securitization transactions either through the formation of multiple legal
entities or within the boundaries of the same SPV leads to contradictory
outcomes. While on one hand Italian regulation lowers the transaction
costs of this partitioning, on the other hand, managing multiple pools of
assets together with the SPV’s legal capital increases the risk of eliminating
the bankruptcy remoteness quality of the vehicle.
C.

Mutual Funds

1.

Overview of Mutual Funds

Another set of legal instruments that deserve special attention from
any research comparing asset partitioning devices are mutual funds. These
117. Clementina Scaroni, Il patrimonio separato della società veicolo per la
cartolarizzazione dei crediti, in CONTRATTO E IMPRESA 1075, 1084, n. 25 (2005); Francesco
Di Ciommo, La securitization tra diritto ed economia, tra normativa nazionale e modelli
stranieri, in LA CARTOLARIZZAZIONE DEI CREDITI IN ITALIA 1, 99 (Roberto Pardolesi ed.,
1999) (noting that, in Italy, unlike in the United States, a Special Purpose Vehicle can
continue to operate as a corporation, possibly outside of its original scope).
118. Some attention has been devoted to verifying the difference between creating an
SPV as a corporation or as a trust. See John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The
Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 182 (1997) (discussing the potent
fiduciary duties that inhere in trust law); Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 100, at 468-69
(outlining the benefits of trusts over corporations in partitioning assets); Steven L.
Schwarcz, Commercial Trust as Business Organizations: Unraveling the Mystery, 58 BUS.
L. 559, 582-83 (2003) (describing the clarity corporations law provides regarding
bankruptcy remoteness and the benefits of trust law where bankruptcy remoteness is not a
concern).
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entities are very different from the ones analyzed so far. In a corporate
subsidiary or asset securitization, asset partitioning is used to segregate
different risks and to attract specialized investment at a lower cost of
credit.119 The purpose of a mutual or pension fund is essentially to serve as
a mediating device between an investor and securities secondary markets.
To this end, investors transfer some of their assets to an intermediary that
becomes the manager of the fund.
One fundamental priority for investors is to shield the managed assets
from claims of the manager’s personal creditors (vertical partitioning).120 In
the U.S., a trust is one of the two devices used to manage a mutual fund
(along with the corporation), and is considered by ERISA to be mandatory
for managing a pension fund.121 Unlike other legal entities, a trust is able to
assure that the fund’s assets are shielded from claims of the manager’s
personal creditors.122 It is a well established rule that “although a trustee
becomes insolvent or bankrupt, the beneficiary retains his interest in the
subject matter of the trust and, accordingly, the beneficiary is entitled [to
retain that interest] as against the general creditors of the trustee.”123
It is widely known that, in most European countries, a body of trust
law has not developed.124 Nonetheless, as stated above, in a numerus
clausus of circumstances the law admits asset partitioning through the
“asset independence” doctrine.125 Mutual funds are included in these welldefined circumstances.
In Italy, there are two different types of mutual fund regulation. In
the first, a fund’s assets are treated as being under joint ownership of the
investors and are managed by a specialized third party. Vertical
partitioning is a direct consequence of this ownership structure; the assets
are not owned by the manager and consequently cannot be seized by its
personal creditors. In the second, assets are transferred to a new entity that
acquires the ownership and manages the fund. In this case, investors are
considered residual claimants of the corporation managing the fund, and no
vertical partitioning is granted.126

119. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 401 (explaining how asset partitioning
can lower credit costs).
120. Id. at 398.
121. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 102, at 467.
122. See id. (“If it were otherwise—if, for example, a pension fund were just an
investment account maintained by the corporation within its corporate shell—the
employees’ pensions would always be subject to the risk of the corporation’s insolvency.”).
123. Langbein, supra note 118, at 179 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §
12 cmt. F (1959) (internal quotations omitted)).
124. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 102, at 434-35.
125. See supra pp. 13-18.
126. See PAOLA IAMICELI P., UNITÀ E SEPARAZIONE DEI PATRIMONI, PADOVA 376-78
(2003) (providing an overview of the mutual fund structure in Italy).
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2. Mutual Series Funds in Italy
Property laws that grant asset partitioning are not only relevant for
shielding managed assets from claims of the manager’s personal creditors;
they also allow a single mutual fund to be structured into several sub-funds
in which contributions from investors are pooled separately. Both the joint
ownership and the new entity schemes described above enable the mutual
fund to segregate the assets among separate portfolios.127
Offering multiple portfolios within the same entity allows investors to
choose the sub-fund that best matches their risk profile and to switch all or
part of their investment from one sub-fund to another easily. Issuing more
than one class of shares is not sufficient to segregate different sub-funds
fully. In order to shield each class of investors from other classes’ risks, a
property law is necessary.
Without a property law granting the segregation between sub-funds,
each class of shares would be affected by the losses suffered by another
series. In the law’s absence, the extent of the rights to participation in the
capital property or distribution account would be the same for each class of
shares, according to the general principle that each share represents a
portion of the general capital of the entity, and not a portion of a sub-fund.
As explained in the course of this Article, without property law enforced
asset partitioning, any creditor or residual claimant of an entity would share
the risks of that entity’s consolidated activity, according to the principle
that each debt is a firm-wide obligation. Consequently, in order to insulate
one pool of assets from investors of a different pool (or series), it is
necessary to establish “asset independence” statutorily.128
In particular, the Italian regulation on mutual funds states that when a
fund is structured as a number of sub-funds, each sub-fund is for all intents
and purposes separate from the others.129 Accordingly, liabilities incurred
with respect to a particular sub-fund are enforceable only against the assets
of that fund, and not against the general patrimony of the mutual fund or
the assets of other sub-funds (defensive asset partitioning). On the other
hand, liabilities incurred with respect to the general activity of the mutual
fund are enforceable only against its general patrimony, and not against the
assets of the sub-funds (affirmative asset partitioning).130

127. See Legisl. Decree. No. 58 of Feb. 24, 1998, art. 36, ¶ 6 and art. 43, ¶ 8 (dictating
each group of assets must be independent).
128. See Lucia Picardi, Commentary, Art. 43, d.lg. 58/1998, in TESTO UNICO DELLA
FINANZA 380, 390 (Gian Franco Campobasso ed., 2002) (clarifying that sub-funds are not
automatically separated from the general investment portfolio).
129. Legisl. Decree. No. 58 of Feb. 24, 1998, art. 36, ¶ 6.
130. Id.
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Mutual Series Funds in the United Kingdom and the United
States

Wholly separate investment portfolios attract diversified investors at
lower monitoring costs because each class of investors has recourse only to
the assets attributable to their segregated portfolio. This beneficial
structure can be achieved within the same mutual fund, or through a family
of separate entities.
Absent a statutory provision granting asset
partitioning, one might predict a preference toward creating a family of
entities, due to the prohibitively high costs of partitioning assets through
contracting.131
Departing from the traditional approach of the common law system,
which conceives asset partitioning only through the creation of a new legal
entity, the United Kingdom has regulated the so-called Umbrella Company.
In 1997, the Financial Services (Open-Ended Investment Companies)
Regulations introduced the possibility for a mutual fund to issue different
classes of shares, each linked to a separate sub-fund.132 Contributions from
shareholders would be pooled separately, so that property and distribution
rights of each class of investors are exclusively backed by the
corresponding sub-fund.133
The United Kingdom regulation reinforces the intuition that without a
property law—a statutory rule “good against the world”—it is effectively
impossible to achieve asset partitioning within the same entity. The U.S.
experience offers further confirmation of this.
In the United States, pursuant to rule 18(f)(3) of the Investment
Company Act of 1940, mutual funds can issue more than one class of
shares.134 In accordance with the fundamental principle that a debt is a
firm-wide obligation, all shareholders’ claims lie on the same investment
portfolio. Consequently, a multi-class structure, while facilitating the
diversification of shares with respect to expenses and distribution,
administration and shareholder services, does not assign different property
and distribution rights to distinct classes of investors.135
In order to insulate the claims and distribution rights of one class of
131. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 406-11 (discussing the high costs of
achieving asset partitioning through contracting).
132. See FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, FINANCIAL SERVICES (OPEN-ENDED
INVESTMENT COMPANIES) REGULATIONS, 1997, Part 11, at 87 (explaining a proposed
umbrella company does not qualify unless each of its proposed sub-funds were a separate
company).
133. Id.
134. 17 C.F.R. §270.18f-3 (2009).
135. See Laurin B. Kleiman & Carla G. Teodoro, Forming, Organizing and Operating a
Mutual Fund—Legal and Practical Considerations, in THE ABCS OF MUTUAL FUNDS 13, 48
(2008).
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shares from other classes, the two typical legal forms of mutual funds, the
trust and the corporation, can create within their boundaries distinct funds
having different investment objectives.136 This structure, normally named
“mutual series funds,” aims to assign a separate pool of assets to each
series so that each class of shares tracks only those assets.137 The ultimate
goal of the series structure is to shield the assets of one series from claims
arising out of, or in connection with, another series.138
Consistent with the fundamental principle that all assets are the
common pledge of creditors, both the common law of trusts and
conventional corporate statutes do not provide a rule allowing assets of one
series to be wholly insulated from creditors of another series. Absenting a
statutory recognition of asset partitioning, the mutual series funds structure
requires each class to monitor the overall financial condition of the mutual
fund. As has been asserted in the case of multiple asset securitization
transactions, the costs of creating fully separate sub-funds through
contracting would seem to outweigh the benefits of avoiding the creation of
multiple legal entities.
4.

The Delaware Series Regulation

In order to give the series structure a statutory foundation, in 1990 the
Delaware Business Trust Act recognized that the governing instrument of a
trust may establish a series of trustees, beneficial interests or beneficial
owners, which have separate rights, powers, or duties with respect to
separate property or obligations of the statutory trust, as well as profits and
losses associated with specific series.139 This reform indicates the
awareness that, without a statutory rule (i.e., property law), the power to
create a wholly separate series without investors’ consent is absent. The
statutory language ensures that with appropriate “records and notices” the
debts, obligations, liabilities, and expenses associated with these particular
series are enforceable only against that series, and not against other series
of the trust or the trust generally.140

136. Some scholars have tried to understand why the trust structure seems to be
dominant in comparison to the corporate structure by focusing their attention on the agency
problem between investors and managers, and exploring the characteristics of fiduciary
duties in trust law as compared to corporate law. Langbein, supra note 21, 625-28; Sitkoff,
supra note 61, at 37-38; Schwarcz, supra note 118, at 573-81. Compare Hansmann &
Mattei, supra note 102, at 469-72 (pointing out the proprietary characteristics of trust law).
137. See Practicing Law Institute, supra note 114, at 412-14.
138. Id.
139. DEL.CODE. ANN. tit. 12, § 3806(b)(1)(2) (2009).
140. See Ann E. Conaway, A Business Review of the Delaware Series: Good Business
for the Informed, in WHAT ALL BUSINESS LAWYERS MUST KNOW ABOUT DELAWARE LAW
DEVELOPMENTS 647, 653 (2008).
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It is worth noting that, even if the series structure were conceived to
allow a single mutual fund to operate different investment portfolios under
a centralized board of directors and a single registration as required by the
Investment Company Act of 1940, this reform has expanded the use of
such a structure to any business purpose.141
In 1996, the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act was amended
to include the series structure. Section 18-215(b) provides that:
[T]he debts, liabilities, obligations and expenses incurred,
contracted for or otherwise existing with respect to a particular
series shall be enforceable against the assets of such series only,
and not against the assets of the limited liability company
generally or any other series thereof, and, unless otherwise
provided in the limited liability company agreement, none of the
debts, liabilities, obligations and expenses incurred, contracted
for or otherwise existing with respect to the limited liability
company generally or any other series thereof shall be
enforceable against the assets of such series.142
In the same year, the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership
Act included Section 17-218, which allowed the creation of a series in a
Delaware limited partnership.143
VI. Conclusions: Convergences Between Civil Law and Common Law
Traditions
A.

Broadening Horizons of the Common Law Tradition

A statutory foundation is nececcesry to create an asset partitioning
within the boundaries of the same legal entity. The Delaware law reforms,
which have been followed by seven other States and Puerto Rico,144
together with the proliferation of the so-called Segregated Portfolio
Companies (SPCs) throughout non-U.S. jurisdictions,145 confirm this
141. See id. at 652-53.
142. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215(b)(1996).
143. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-218 (1996).
144. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215 (2009) (providing for asset partitioning within
limited liability companies); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/37-40 (2009); IOWA CODE §
490A.305 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. §86.296 (2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, §2054.4 (2009);
TENN. CODE ANN. 48-249-309 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-606 (2009); P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 14, § 3426(p) (2004). In addition to Segregated Portfolio Companies legislation
(which deals with limited liability companies), a number of states provide for the creation of
series within a trust. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §34-517(b)(2) (2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §
3806(b)(2) (2009); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS. § 12-207(b) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 88A.280 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-B:7, II(d) (2009); VA. CODE ANN. §13.11219 (2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. §17-23-108(b)(ii) (2009).
145. In particular: Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Guernsey,
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determination. This Article has given such a statutory provision the label
of property law.
The possibility of separating assets between different investment
portfolios without the investors’ consent spares the costs of achieving the
same result through contracting and, alternatively, the costs of creating
multiple legal entities. Multiple legal entities implicitly necessitate the
duplication of governance structures, expenses, agreements with service
providers, prospectuses, periodic reports, and other regulatory filings.146 A
single entity that offers segregated investment portfolios can eliminate the
costs of duplication while benefiting from the efficiencies of attracting
diversified categories of creditors.
In conclusion, the specific case of mutual funds could signal a global
trend toward the recognition of asset partitioning within the boundaries of
the same legal entity. While this structure is familiar to the civil law
tradition thanks to the “asset independence” doctrine, it seems to have been
less explored in the common law tradition. In the future, it will be
important to observe whether the legal reforms implemented in Delaware,
which expanded the possibility of using the series structure for any
business purpose within the boundaries of a business trust, limited liability
company or limited partnership will lead to a similar alignment between the
common and civil law traditions for other business practices.
To this end, a critical factor will be whether, in the future, the series
structure is also considered in corporate statutes. The suggested reform
appears to be the necessary step for filling some of the gaps between the
common law and civil law traditions that this Article has attempted to
describe. Allowing for asset partitioning within the same entity has proven
an efficient way to overcome the tradeoff between the economies of scale
that derive from operating multiple transactions under one entity
(integration), and the efficiency gains that result from asset partitioning
(tailoring).
B.

Broadening Horizons of the Civil Law Tradition

Comparative studies on asset partitioning have traditionally focused
on the possibility of transferring trusts law to a civil law environment.
Notwithstanding the fact that this Article has come at the matter from the
opposite perspective, by inquiring as to whether the civil law tradition can
offer insight to the common law debate on asset partitioning, it seems
relevant to describe the most recent impacts of trusts law on civil law
Luxembourg, and Mauritius.
146. See Victoria E. Schonfeld & Thomas M.J. Kerwin, Organization of a Mutual Fund,
49 BUS. LAW. 107, 116 (1993) (discussing the costs and benefits of creating multiple legal
entities).
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countries.
At this stage, we would be well served to remember that, in the civil
law tradition, only in a numerus clausus of circumstances provided by
property laws is a legal subject able to partition his patrimony into separate
funds. Here, what civil law countries have traditionally lacked is a general
legal scheme able to provide for the partitioning of assets under an
indefinite number of circumstances.
The common law tradition has developed trusts law, which has turned
out to be an extremely flexible device capable of granting asset partitioning
for a virtually indefinite set of purposes. In contrast, civil law countries
have taken an opposite path, granting specific property laws which allow
asset partitioning for highly scrutinized purposes.
This pattern began to shift in 1985, thanks to the adoption of The
Hague Trusts Convention, which has been ratified thus far by Italy, The
Netherlands,147 Malta, Luxembourg and Switzerland. This Convention is
aimed at providing for the recognition of foreign trusts, through the
application of foreign trust laws, in countries where the trust concept is
completely unknown.148
Thus far, many European countries have been reluctant to ratify the
Hague Convention which, nevertheless, has stimulated a debate in many
countries over the prospect of a legal device that would share the
characteristics of a common law trust. While the small Republic of San
Marino has decided to fully regulate the trust,149 Luxembourg, Lichtenstein,
France and Italy, who refuse to introduce such an alien instrument into their
legal systems, have decided instead to reshape domestic devices for the
purpose of achieving an outcome functionally resembling that of the
trust.150 All of these countries, with the exception of Italy,151 preferred to
147. Notwithstanding the ratification of the Hague Convention, in 1992 the Dutch
legislator struck down the proposal to introduce a regulation of a national trust. In particular,
the Legislator added one provision that seems incompatible with the common law trust
structure: “A juridical act which is intended to transfer property for purposes of security or
which does not have the purpose of bringing the property into the patrimony of the acquirer,
after transfer, does not constitute a valid title for transfer of that property.” Burgerlijk
Wetboek art. 84, ¶ 3, ch. III.
148. See Jonathan Harris, THE HAGUE TRUSTS CONVENTION: SCOPE, APPLICATION AND
PRELIMINARY ISSUES 81 (2002) (discussing the scope and aims of The Hague Trusts
Convention); Donovan W.M. Waters, The Hague Trusts Convention Twenty Years On, in
COMMERCIAL TRUSTS IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 56 (Michele Graziadei et al. eds., 2005).
149. See Trust Act, Law No. 37, art. 63 of March 17, 2005 (San Marino) (finding that
trusts are “regulated by the law of the Republic of San Marino”).
150. Serena Meucci, Contratti di fiducie, destinazione e trust:
l’evoluzione
dell’ordinamento francese nel quadro europeo, in RIVISTA DI DIRITTO PRIVATO 829, 835
(2007).
151. The Italian civil code has been amended in order to introduce a legal device that
resembles a trust’s essential features with respect to asset partitioning. See art. 2645 ter c.c.
(allowing real and personal property registered for specific interests to be protected from

ELGUETAFINALIZED_SIX

2010]

3/31/2010 2:04:51 AM

COMMON LAW VS. CIVIL LAW ON ASSET PARTITIONING

553

amend the fiducia, a device which originates from ancient Roman Law in
the concept of fideicomissa, and is deeply rooted in the civil law
tradition.152
The fiducia is a contract between the “constituent” (i.e., the settlor)
and the fiduciario (i.e., the trustee), where determined property is
transferred to the fiduciario. The transferred property is dedicated to the
benefit of a third party (and/or to the benefit of the “constituent”) or to a
specific purpose, and the fiduciario has the obligation to manage the
property according to the instructions of the “constituent”. Upon expiration
of the contract, the fiduciario must return the property either to the
“constituent” or to the beneficiaries. In contrast to the trust, the fiducia
does not distinguish between legal ownership and equitable/beneficial
ownership. Consequently, the fiduciario has full disposal of the property
and both the constituent and beneficiary after accepting the beneficial
provision have only a contractual claim toward the fiduciario.
According to trusts law, if the trustee becomes insolvent, the trust
property he administers is unavailable to satisfy the trustee's obligations to
his personal creditors.153 In contrast, in the fiducia, there is no segregation
of assets between the dedicated property (transferred by the constituent to
the fiduciario) and personal property of the fiduciario. Therefore, the
traditional civil law fiducia does not provide any asset partitioning.154
In keeping with the civil law tradition where asset partitioning is only
granted by a specific property law in a limited number of business
transactions, the fiducia, which can serve an indefinite number of purposes,
normally lacks the ability to segregate assets without the consent of
different categories of creditors (the beneficiaries and the fiduciario’s
personal creditors).155
Luxembourg, Lichtenstein and France decided to intervene in order to
provide the fiducia with a property law that would enable a partitioning
between the managed assets and the personal property of the fiduciario. In
particular, the French legislator, through Article 2025 of the French civil
code provided that the managed assets are the common pledge of only

third party claimants). A detailed description of this device would be beyond the scope of
this study. For further details, see Giacomo Rojas Elgueta, Il rapporto tra l'art. 2645-ter
c.c. e l'art. 2740 c.c.: un'analisi economica della nuova disciplina, in BANCA, BORSA,
TITOLI DI CREDITO 185 (2007).
152. See Michele Graziadei, The Development Of Fiducia In Italian And French Law
From The 14th Century To The End Of The Ancien Régime, in ITINERA FIDUCIAE. TRUST
AND TREUHAND IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 327 (Richard Helmholz & Reinhard
Zimmermann eds., 1998) (discussing the historical development of the fiducia in Italy and
France).
153. Blair, supra note 5, at 392.
154. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 102, at 443-44 and 456.
155. Id. at 456.
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those creditors whose claim is related to the managed property.156 This
rule, by acknowledging that it would be effectively impossible to create an
affirmative asset partitioning through contracting, shifts the traditional
contractual nature of the fiducia device to a new proprietary foundation.157
Using Hansmann and Kraakman’s terminology, it could be said that the
French fiducia is a new example of organizational law.
Notwithstanding the new direction marked by the French law reform
toward continental acceptance of a legal device which offers affirmative
asset partitioning to an open-ended set of purposes, there is still a
remarkable resistance to introducing something as general as the trust. In
fact, according to the new French regulation: A) the fiducia comes to an
end within the durational limit of ninety-nine years, while the duration of a
trust is often unlimited;158 B) the fiducia can be constituted only by
contract, while the trust may be the result of a unilateral declaration by an
owner of property either during the settlor’s lifetime or by will;159 C) the
role of fiduciario is reserved only for certain entities having legal
personality (investment and insurance companies) and for attorneys at
law.160
The French reform illustrates the resistance to adopting legal devices
that diverge from a country’s tradition. The field of asset partitioning
offers an interesting case in which financial transactions are becoming the
primary motivating force in breaching these obstacles and dictating
uniform global solutions.

156. Art. 2025 of the French civil code states that “[t]he trust fund's assets can only be
seized in a legal proceeding by the holders of claims arising from the underlying assets of
the trust or holders of claims related to the management of the trust.”
157. On the new regulation of the French fiducie, see Claude Witz, La fiducie française
face aux expériences étrangères et à la Convention de La Haye relative au trust, RECUIL
DALLOZ 1369 (2007); Christian Larroumet, La loi du février 2007 sur la fiducie. Propos
critique, RECUIL DALLOZ 1350 (2007). Similar legal reforms have occurred in Latin
America. The segregation of assets has been provided for, for example, in the Uruguayan
law regulating the fiducia. Normas Sobre Fideicomiso 17.703, ch. I, art. 7. For further
information about trusts in Latin American legal systems, see Dante Figueroa, Civil Law
Trusts in Latin America: Is the Lack of Trusts an Impediment for Expanding Business
Opportunities in Latin America?, 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L COMP. L. 701 (2007).
158. C. civ. art. 2018. On the tendency of abolishing the Rule Against Perpetuities in the
U.S., see Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining the
Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2465 (2006).
159. On the testamentary trusts, see Langbein, supra note 21, 636-37.
160. C. civ. art. 2015.

